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Abstract This paper discusses how persisting, powerful narratives inform and
shape the green economy in the Global South. Green economy strategies often
evolve around market-based and technological solutions to the planetary crises,
particularly in industrialized countries. In developing countries with rich resource
bases, however, green transitions often imply various forms of modernization of
the ways in which natural resources are managed, utilized and controlled. This,
I argue, is a result of the process in which the green economy agenda is shaped
by elites through narratives that feed into and inform green economy discourses
and policies in resource-rich countries in the Global South. While much literature
discusses variegated green economy schemes in the Global South and their out-
comes, this paper discusses how these practices and policies are driven by power-
ful narratives that essentially shape green economy agendas. I argue that a
persisting neo-Malthusian narrative of resource scarcity, degradation and overpo-
pulation co-exists with a resource abundance narrative, holding that pristine
natural resources are vast, but under threat, and that capital, ‘know-how’ and tech-
nology can protect and develop these resources while at the same time accumulate
economic growth. As a result, the green economy in the Global South is often nar-
rated and implemented under a discourse of modernization of natural resource
management.
Keywords: green economy; narratives; discourses; Global South; modernization
discourse; natural resources
1. Introduction
In the aftermath of the converging crises of food, finance and energy between 2007 and
2009, the planetary crisis received increased attention in political, popular and aca-
demic circles. For many, this represented a ‘unique moment in history, in which
major environmental and economic challenges could be tackled simultaneously’
(Tienhaara, 2014, p. 1). Global policymakers, such as the United Nations Environment
Program (UNEP), the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development
(OECD) and the World Bank, began working on strategies to redirect the crises of
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the economy, the environment, and persisting global poverty. These efforts materia-
lized at the United Nations Conference on Sustainable Development, Rio+20, in
2012, where one of the main outcomes was the conceptualization of the green
economy (UNEP, 2011).
A green economy is an economy ‘that results in improved human well-being and
social equity, while significantly reducing environmental and ecological scarcities’
(UNEP, 2011, p. 16). There are many ways in which the green economy is being
implemented in practice, but there is an overwhelming emphasis on market-based
and technological solutions to environmental challenges (Scoones et al., 2015). In
industrialized countries, the focus is usually on investments, technology and inno-
vation in renewable energies, as well as making fossil fuels more energy – and
cost-efficient, much along the lines of ecological modernization (Mol and Spaargaren,
2000). In the Global South, however, green economy measures are usually
implemented in natural resource sectors (Brown et al., 2014; Bergius and Buseth,
2019; Buseth, 2017; Cavanagh and Benjaminsen, 2017; UNEP, 2011; World Bank,
2012).1 One reason for this is that the combined targets of the green economy –
poverty reduction, climate measures and economic growth – have spurred initiatives
that aim to merge these agendas in the same package. A wide range of initiatives tar-
geting the management, utilization or protection of natural resources are being rolled
out under green economy banners across the Global South, and a substantial amount of
published research discusses the logics and consequences of various green initiatives
(Büscher and Fletcher, 2015; Cavanagh and Benjaminsen, 2017; Death, 2015; Ehres-
man and Okereke, 2015). Investments and capital accumulation targeted new sectors
after the financial crackdowns of 2007–2009. There is an increasing trend that invest-
ments in natural resource sectors are being framed as ‘green growth,’ merely based on
the combination of economic growth and natural resources. In line with Harvey
(2001), Patel and Moore (2017) argue that such use of natural resource sectors is
based on capitalism’s constant drive towards expansion, or a ‘spatial fix.’ Bergius
and Buseth (2019, p. 59) also state that ‘green sectors in the Global South have
become important outlets for international capital in recent years – reinforcing a con-
temporary cycle of ‘material expansion’ in this stage of capitalism.’ Kröger (2013)
found similar patterns in his study of ‘forestry capitalism’ in Brazil, and Benjaminsen
1 The ‘Global South’ is a broad and imprecise category of which all countries are of course not
homogenous. There is furthermore obviously no dichotomy between the ‘Global North’ and
the ‘Global South’ – neither geographically nor politically-economically. However, some sort
of generalizing terminology is unavoidable for the purpose of discussing discursive trends.
Policy documents, policymakers, actors and existing literature make the same categorization.
There are therefore many exceptions to this categorization, but the broad division nonetheless
remains. When referring to the ‘Global South’ throughout this paper, it generally means not
industrialized, developing countries with rich resource bases, typically ‘poor’ countries in the
Southern hemisphere.
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and Bryceson (2012) discussed capital accumulation, or ‘accumulation by disposses-
sion,’ through acquisition of land and coastal reserves in Tanzania.
Many studies criticize various ‘green’ schemes and their implications as conse-
quences of the green economy; examples include REDD+ (Lund et al., 2017; Svarstad
and Benjaminsen, 2017), carbon forests (Leach and Scoones, 2015; Lyons and
Westoby, 2014), climate-smart agriculture and the new green revolution for Africa
(Bergius et al. 2018; Bergius and Buseth, 2019; Newell and Taylor, 2018), biofuel pro-
duction (Boamah, 2014), nature conservation (Büscher and Fletcher, 2015; Sullivan,
2013), and ecotourism (Fletcher and Neves, 2012). Such studies are important for
understanding how the green economy manifests, but there is a gap in research on
the discursive drivers behind green economy agendas (Scoones et al., 2015). As
Asiyanbi (2015) argues, a growing body of work on ‘neoliberal natures’ has failed
to make enough effort to assess how discourses of the green shift are being translated
into realities on the ground. It is therefore important to analyze the green economy not
only by its actual implementations, but also by discursive drivers behind these policies
and practices (Bailey and Caprotti, 2014). In order to address this gap, this paper dis-
cusses how narratives and discourses inform and justify green economy agendas in
resource rich developing countries in the Global South. Building on Hajer (1995),
the contribution lies mainly within discussing how two distinct narratives inform
green economy discourses and policies.
These narratives are (1) a persisting neo-Malthusian narrative of resource degra-
dation, scarcity and overpopulation, and (2) a narrative of resource abundance in
the context of the Global South. Several powerful actors, such as the World Bank
(2013; 2019), base their policy agendas on the idea that resource bases in developing
countries are rich and pristine, but threatened by degradation, as also Scoones et al.
(2018) found. Key policy documents hold that capital and technology inflows will
protect these natural resources and at the same time accumulate green growth and
development under the threefold goals of the green economy (OECD, 2009; UNEP,
2011; World Bank, 2013; 2019). Indeed, Scoones et al. (2018) argue that ‘scarcity’
narratives became dominant motivations and justifications in the rush for Africa’s
farmland after the food price pike in the years 2007–2009.
In this paper, I argue that such narratives have been a driving force also in behind
green economy policies in the Global South at large since Rio+20.2 This is supported
by Bergius et al. (2020), who demonstrate how degradation narratives have justified
and paved the way for the implementation of a green economy in the case of Tanzania.
2 Many countries in the Global South also apply technology-centered green economy
approaches, such as in energy or industrial innovation (see e.g. Death 2016). Some countries
across the Global South have more comprehensive green economy strategies than others, and
some countries’ strategies delve more into innovation, industry and renewable energy. See
e.g. https://www.un-page.org/countries/page-countries for a broad policy/UN-oriented over-
view of green economy strategies and measures in selected countries across the Global South
(accessed 20.12.19).
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The result is a strong modernization discourse holding that natural resources and land
use systems in developing countries must be modernized in order to reach the prosper-
ous levels of societies in the Global North, along the lines of Rostow (1960) and
classic modernization thinking. Modernization as a development idea was most pro-
minent during the post-war era (McMichael, 2012), but has roots back to the sixteenth
and seventeenth century enlightenment history in Europe, where a dualism between
humans and nature held that humans should control nature (Descartes, 1985,
pp. 142-143). People living in the colonies, of course, was considered part of
nature. This dualism and urge to control nature and underdeveloped areas of the
world by far justified colonialism, and later ‘development.’ As Bergius and Buseth
(2019, p. 59) hold, modernization thinking in the post-war period ‘spelled out a geo-
graphical divide between the ‘progressive’ cores of ‘modernity’ and the ‘lagging’ per-
ipheries of ‘tradition’.’ Development equaled modernization, and controlling nature
and resources through the use of capital and technology was core in this thinking.
The dichotomy between humans and nature, and the urge to modernize, has later
been reframed under the green economy as a core part of contemporary global capit-
alism and the climate crisis. This links to a general recent turn towards involving
private sector actors in development programs, and the ‘trade not aid’ trend, which
has spurred an increase in public–private partnerships and philanthrocapitalism in
many sectors, including environmental policies (Adelman, 2009; Arndt and Tarp,
2017). This private turn often combines development, climate measures and economic
growth, effectively channeling donor money into green sectors in the Global South
(Arndt and Tarp, 2017). Bergius et al. (2018, p. 825) hold that in Africa, the green
economy is increasingly manifested through the use of green agendas in order to
strengthen the idea that development equals modernization through ‘capital-intensive
land investments.’ Green (2015, p. 632) argues that after the converging crises of the
late 2000s, development funding has largely been prioritized towards the private
sector. This is part of the reason why the modernization discourse has revitalized
under the green economy. Bergius and Buseth (2019) call this ‘green modernization,’
and discuss how this discourse has advanced certain ‘incarnations’ of dominant mod-
ernization narratives, such as capital and technology transfers, mobility of land and
people, a renewed traditional/modern dualism, and new private-sector versions of
‘stages to growth.’
Current green economy debates, policies and practices are essentially apolitical
(Newell, 2015), meaning that they pay little or no attention to power structures or
policy implications of green transformations. Indeed, Newell (2015, p. 69) argues
that policy and scholarly debates have focused more on the ‘governance of transitions
than the politics of transformations.’ Political ecology may therefore offer a useful fra-
mework for the study of how narratives and discourses drive policies in natural
resource management. The interaction between natural resources, power and politics
is of main concern for political ecologists, who seek to unmask power structures and
key assumptions underpinning natural resource management (Adger et al., 2001; Peet
4 J. T. Buseth
et al., 2011). Political ecology is, according to Forsyth (2003, p. 2), useful as a frame-
work to explain ‘the social and political conditions surrounding the causes, experi-
ences, and management of environmental problems.’ Political ecology seeks to
critically see the environment, and natural resources, through a contextual approach;
it sees the nature as power-laden, and focuses on multilevel connections, structures
and actors in the environment and among decision-makers and hierarchies of power
(Adger et al., 2001). Stott and Sullivan (2000) emphasize the importance of tracing
environmental narratives by identifying power structures, and a key approach
within political ecology is to link discourses to current environmental policies. Politi-
cal ecology is useful for the analysis of power and multilevel politics in environmental
governance (Adger et al., 2001), such as the green economy, and therefore undergirds
the discussion in this paper.
The findings presented in this paper are based on a review and discourse analysis of
policy documents,3 and data collection undertaken between 2015 and 2017. I applied
qualitative methods, including in-depth interviews with key actors in global and multi-
national organizations and institutions working within the green economy in different
ways.4 The analysis furthermore builds on event ethnography (Campbell et al., 2014)
carried out at several big international green economy policy conferences.5 I analyzed
the data qualitatively, particularly under a discourse and narrative analysis framework
through methods of coding and identification of regularities across transcripts and
documents, building on Foucault’s (1972) ‘archaeology of knowledge’ and ‘genealogy
of power’ (Foucault, 1980) which treats power as productive, meaning power can be
influential through discourses. The analysis was further built on Roe’s concept of
policy narrative analysis (Roe, 1994), and Dryzek’s framework for analyzing environ-
mental discourses (Dryzek, 2013).
3 The analyzed documents are primarily key policy reports and strategies by UNEP, the OECD,
theWorld Bank, the Partnership for Action on Green Economy (PAGE), and theWorld Econ-
omic Forum (WEF). I also reviewed project strategies and documents from REDD+ projects,
Payment for Ecosystem Services (PES) schemes, and agricultural corridors in Africa, in
addition to White Papers and investment strategy papers by selected investors.
4 Actors interviewed were working in international or multinational institutions or organiz-
ations, many of them in institutions operating across several countries in the Global South.
I also interviewed informants at government level and with investors in specific countries.
Most of the informants were representatives from multinational organizations or institutions
working also outside the respective country in which the data collection took place. Most
importantly; the trends described in this paper are similar across many countries in the
Global South (see e.g. Bergius and Buseth, 2019; Dawson et al., 2016; De Schutter, 2015;
McKeon, 2014; Moseley, 2017; Patel et al., 2015).
5 The events took place at OECD in Paris in 2015, in South Korea, led by OECD, UNEP,
PAGE and the Global Green Growth Institute (GGGI), in 2016, in Dubai in 2016 (the
World Green Economy Summit) (followed online), in Oslo in 2016, and in Tanzania in
2017 (an annual meeting of a multinational green growth scheme). The events are not
further identified since informants who spoke here are anonymized in this paper.
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2. Discourses and narratives
I follow Hajer’s (1995, p. 44) understanding of a discourse as a ‘specific ensemble of
ideas, concepts, and categorizations that are produced, reproduced, and transformed in
a particular set of practices and through which meaning is given to physical and social
realities.’ Svarstad and Benjaminsen (2017) define a discourse as a shared way of com-
prehension that can be regarded as lenses that you see a certain topic through. Dryzek
(2013, p. 9) holds that a discourse enables ‘those who subscribe to it to interpret bits of
information and put them together into coherent stories or accounts.’ Discourses legit-
imize knowledge, and ‘coordinate the actions of… people and organizations’
(Dryzek, 2013, p. 10), especially in global politics, power and practices (Hajer,
1995). According to Svarstad et al. (2017, p. 356), discursive power is being exercised
‘when actors such as corporations, government agencies or NGOs produce discourses
and manage to get other groups to adopt and contribute to the reproduction of their
discourses.’ I see discursive power as being exercised also when a discourse has the
power to influence policy or actions.
A narrative is a social construction of a more specific case. For this study, narra-
tives are important as drivers of assumptions, discourses and policies. According to
Roe (1991, p. 288), development narratives exist ‘to tell stories or scenarios that sim-
plify the ambiguity’ of practitioners, bureaucrats and policymakers, especially in rural
development. A narrative is a story that usually has a beginning (typically a problem),
a middle, and an end, which can be a solution, a premise, or a conclusion in an argu-
ment. Narratives are meant to simplify and inform the reader, but also to provoke feel-
ings, and the actors in a narrative are often portrayed as heroes, victims or villains. Roe
(1991) argues that development narratives are not so much concerned with what
should happen as with what will happen. The objective of such narratives is therefore
often to persuade the reader to engage in or act upon the presented problem. Roe’s
(1994) concept of narrative policy analysis can be used to explain how certain
stories dominate and how they lead to action through policies or implemented
schemes. Molle (2008, p. 31), for example, draws on narratives as storylines to
explain how policy is formed in the water sector in Africa. In this paper, I discuss nar-
ratives that drive discourses, to illustrate how green economy policies are formed and
shaped. I examine how discourses shape agency and policy, and how discourses are
informed and driven by narratives, as selected bits of information. For this purpose,
I find Hajer’s (1995, p. 61) work on discourse institutionalization useful, to shed
light on how and when a given discourse is translated into policy and institutional
arrangements. Hajer (1995, p. 1) defined environmental discourses as ‘fragmented
and contradictory,’ and as ‘an astonishing collection of claims and concerns brought
together by a great variety of actors.’He used the example of ecological modernization
to demonstrate how discourses were translated into politics. For this paper, Hajer’s
(1995) work is relevant for understanding how discourses feed into the formation of
green economy policies.
6 J. T. Buseth
3. Green economies
UNEP’s report Towards a Green Economy (UNEP, 2011) has been essential for the
mainstreaming of green economy concepts, agendas and policies after Rio+20. Fur-
thermore, OECD’s report Green Growth: Overcoming the Crisis and Beyond
(OECD, 2009) has been particularly influential in the business sector and for govern-
ments of industrialized countries. According to the OECD;
Green Growth means fostering economic growth and development, while ensuring that
natural assets continue to provide the resources and environmental services on which
our well-being relies. To do this, it must catalyse investment and innovation which
will underpin sustained growth and give rise to new economic opportunities. (OECD,
2011, p. 4)
The above-discussed green economy definitions are widely used among different
actors, including environmentalists, practitioners, the business sector, and politicians,
and has brought together actors with different agendas behind the same proclaimed,
but fuzzy, goals.
Given the ambiguity of the green economy, it is necessary to distinguish between
green economy schemes that are being rolled out in various contexts, on the one hand
(Death, 2015; 2016), and green economy discourses that shape the policies behind
these practices, on the other hand (Dryzek, 2013; Scoones et al., 2015). Following
Hajer’s concept of ‘discourse coalitions’ (Hajer, 1993), many distinct versions of a
green economy can be identified, and the green economy has been categorized discur-
sively in several ways (see e.g. Bina, 2013; Ehresman and Okereke, 2015; Ferguson,
2015; Scoones et al., 2015). Death (2015) discusses how various discourses are man-
ifested in national green economy strategies and policies, and how they – despite being
fundamentally different – are categorized under the same green umbrellas by their pro-
ponents. This illustrates how the green economy agenda is being narrated in different
ways despite the lack of a common understanding of the concept.
It also, however, illustrates a blind spot towards discursive drivers behind the green
economy in the Global South. Most green economy approaches and agendas discussed
in the literature predominantly fits industrialized countries and wealthy societies. And
they can – broadly – be summarized in two overall discourses: green growth and green
(technological) transitions. However, when implemented in the Global South, typi-
cally resource rich developing countries, these agendas merge into a modernization
of natural resource management discourse. This does not only represent an increasing
practice, but also a distinct green economy discourse that has not been sufficiently
recognized in the literature. I argue that this discourse is a result of how prevailing nar-
ratives feed into green economy agendas in the process towards policy
implementation.
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4. Narrating problems and solutions in the green economies of the global
south
The combination of green growth and technological transitions unveils an interesting
merging of ideas – or to put it another way, it illustrates two strangely intertwined
ways in which the green economy is being narrated in the Global South. The long-
standing degradation/ overpopulation narrative, is coupled with a belief that we can
overcome the scarcity crisis if we invest in natural resources, in terms of both
capital and technology (Scoones et al., 2018). This is justified by a narrative saying
that while Africa’s natural resources are being degraded, they are also pristine, abun-
dant and vast, only waiting to be ‘developed.’ In sum, these narratives comprise amod-
ernization of natural resource management discourse particularly evident in the
Global South. The narratives represent a ‘problem’ storyline of resource scarcity,
degradation, poverty, and overpopulation, and a ‘solution’ storyline saying that we
can add technology, ‘know-how’ and capital into natural resource sectors in order
to overcome the aforementioned challenges. Informed by this, the green economy
in the Global South is therefore often implemented through schemes that seek to
protect, modernize or profit from ‘green’ sectors, resulting in transformed ways in
which natural resources are managed, governed and controlled.
4.1. The problem: ‘poor people make poor land’
An initial driver behind the green economy in the mid-2000s was a recognition that the
pressure on the planet is reaching its limits (Rockström et al., 2009; UNEP, 2011).
This ‘limits’ idea is by no means new, rather it represents a renaissance of long-stand-
ing ideas. Malthus suggested this link already in (1798 [1998]), claiming that popu-
lation growth would outstrip food production. A few hundred years later, The Club
of Rome’s 1972 report The Limits to Growth discussed how population growth and
unsustainable use of the world’s resources threatened the planet and humanity
(Meadows et al., 1972; see also Ehrlich, 1968). Dryzek (2013) argues that after a
short decade of ‘environmental problem solving’ in the 1960s – closely linked to
the first photography of Earth from space, Carson’s 1962 publication Silent Spring
and eventually the ‘environmental awakening’ in the US – we saw the rise of a
‘limits and survival’ discourse in the 1970s. Dryzek (2013, p. 25) holds; ‘exponential
growth in both human numbers and the level of economic activity meant that there was
no time to lose, for humanity seemed to be heading for the limits at an ever-increasing
pace. Hitting these limits would mean global disaster and a crash in human popu-
lations.’ This discourse has persisted, but was situated more in the background
during the 1980s’ and 1990s’ sustainability discourse. Rather, under the advent of neo-
liberalism in the 1980s, a Promethean view that the Earth was in fact unlimited, gained
traction. The argument was that indigenous people had always developed substitutes to
resources that had run out, or – a more updated version – technology would find
8 J. T. Buseth
solutions (Dryzek, 2013, p. 26). This view paved the way for the rise of ecological mod-
ernization. The main tenets of eco-modernization, is an ecologization of production,
market and regulatory reforms that reflect ecological priorities, and the ‘greening’ of
both social and corporate practices – predominantly focusing on countries in the
Global North (Low and Gleeson, 1998). Simultaneously, with regards to the global
South, the link between poverty, population pressure and environmental degradation
was reframed. To theWCED (1987), it was important to present new andmore optimis-
tic ideas about sustainability, prosperity and economic growth – as opposed to the doom
predictions by Meadows et al. (1972). This was in line with the general turn towards
neoliberalism and the focus on ‘human development’ we saw towards the end of the
1980s. But the perceived link between poverty, population and degradation was strong:
Many parts of the world are caught in a vicious spiral: poor people are forced to overuse
environmental resources to survive from day to day, and their impoverishment of their
environment further impoverishes them, making their survival ever more difficult and
uncertain. (WCED, 1987, p. 28).
Two decades later, UNEP (2011, p. 15) said that ‘the link between population
dynamics and sustainable development is strong and inseparable’ and that
[a] transition to a green economy can assist in overcoming the contribution that popu-
lation growth makes to the depletion of scarce natural resources. The world’s least devel-
oped countries (LDCs) are more strongly affected by environmental degradation than
most other developing countries, so therefore they have much to gain from the transition
to a green economy. (UNEP, 2011, p. 15)
This overpopulation narrative is strong and persistent. Ojeda et al. (2018, p. 1) found
that environmental policies in the Anthropocene builds heavily on a ‘larger project of
population control,’ and demonstrates several ways in which elites, policy-makers and
scholars have ‘updated Malthus’ ideas of human population stretching natural limits,
applying them to problems like soil erosion, deforestation, pollution, and now climate
change’ (2019, p. 2). Indeed, Scoones et al. (2018) argue that the crises of 2007–9 ‘gal-
vanized a series of scarcity narratives justifying interventions around land and
resources.’ Scarcity narratives are not new, but they have been renewed under
global warming and the green economy, in new packages, and laid an important foun-
dation for how actors think about natural resource sectors in the green transitions of
resource-rich developing countries. One contemporary example of this narrative, as
reemerged under the green economy in the Global South, is The Nature Conservancy’s
Adopt an Acre program, which enables consumers to ‘adopt’ (in the exchange for a
donation) a piece of land in order to protect it from degradation.6 On a webpage
that has since been removed, they argued that
6 https://www.nature.org/en-us/membership-and-giving/donate-to-our-mission/other-ways-to-
give/adopt-an-acre/ (accessed May 29, 2019)
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60 percent of Africa’s lands and waters – community property, in a sense – are managed
by the people who live on them…A continuing threat is their lack of control over the
communal lands and waters they depend on for survival.7
Also UNEP (2011, p. 14) states that:
Currently, there is no international consensus on the problem of global food security or
on possible solutions for how to nourish a population of 9 billion by 2050.… Freshwater
scarcity is already a global problem, and forecasts suggest a growing gap.
These narratives ‘prove useful for elites who seek to avoid responsibility’ – for con-
flicts, for scarcity or simply as an alibi for continued economic growth (Ojeda et al.,
2018, p. 6). Furthermore, this illustrates the story about how ‘we’ should intervene
in natural resource management in order to ‘save’ the planet’s degrading resources,
and at the same time make money. As the above quote from The Nature Conservancy
(TNC) shows, green economy policies are based on a narrative that poverty and over-
population contribute to resource degradation. Proponents of this view hold that popu-
lation growth is threatening natural resources, and measures to halt population growth
should therefore be an integrated part of the solution to hinder planetary degradation –
particularly in the Global South, where the problem is perceived to be most serious
(World Bank, 2012; WCED, 1987).
Powerful actors and policymakers regard traditional sectors such as small-scale
agriculture and pastoralism as inefficient and ‘backwards’ production systems that
are degrading the environment (Bergius et al., 2020; World Bank, 2013). Although
many have raised questions about this link (e.g. Gray and Moseley, 2005), these nar-
ratives are still frequently used, and feed into green transition agendas in the Global
South. For example, the World Bank report titled Inclusive Green Growth: The
Pathway to Sustainable Development holds that one main problem for what is
usually called ‘natural capital’ under the green economy, is that soil is being degraded
because of ‘poor’ use, and that ‘land users need to be given the right economic incen-
tives in preventing or mitigating land degradation’ (World Bank,2012, p. 110). One
chapter in the report is devoted to describing how natural capital, primarily in devel-
oping countries, should be managed in new ways in order to implement a green
economy. One problem that the World Bank points to, is how resources such as
forests and fisheries in developing countries usually are open access and poorly
managed, and should change (echoing Hardin, 1968). It also holds that soil degra-
dation is a problem due to poor agricultural and grazing practices, which must be
managed in new ways. These views are rather common in key green economy
policy documents, such as those by UNEP (2011), the OECD (2009) and the World
Bank (2012; 2013; 2019). The policy agendas echo the ‘limits and survival’ discourse
7 http://www.nature.org/ourinitiatives/regions/africa/howwework/index.htm (accessed March
11, 2014)
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of the 1970s, and we see a trend where contemporary policy frameworks for environ-
mental management meet longstanding narratives that have informed and justified
natural resource management for centuries (Roe, 1991; 1994).
Decision-makers, practitioners and investors, as well as local and national elites,
argue along similar lines.8 For example, one senior representative of a prominent
global agribusiness company said the following about smallholders in the African
country in which he was based:
Also soil degradation here is a big, big thing. And one of the main reasons is how badly
[the smallholders] treat the soil. First of all on the animal life, they devastate absolutely
everything they don’t need…Because they have this thing, smallholders, and then what
they do, because they have such a low productivity, they just devastate everything, and it
will devastate more and more [soil].9
A number of other informants echoed these views. When asked how or why a green
economy should be implemented in the Global South, the response was usually
along the lines of ‘because land is becoming degraded,’ ‘because of mismanagement
of natural resources,’ ‘because of deforestation,’ or ‘rural farmers don’t know how to
treat the soil.’10 Policy-makers at both global level, in multinational organizations, or
national authorities produce the same story – not based on scientific research, but
based on strong, persisting beliefs and the fact that ‘others’ tell the same story.11
UNEP (2011, p. 15) for example argues that ‘[a] transition to a green economy can
assist in overcoming the contribution that population growth makes to the depletion
of scarce natural resources.’ This storyline is frequently referred to in national invest-
ment strategies and natural resource policy documents in countries in the Global South
(e.g. SAGCOT, 2013; World Bank, 2019). This illustrates how narratives form dis-
courses that feed into policy and political decisions. Others have identified similar
stories that mask the political and economic realities of overpopulation and resource
scarcity (Ojeda, 2018).
The green economy is often branded and implemented in ways that do not correlate
well with the ambitious promises made in policies and strategies. The reframed policy
agendas of scarcity, limits and degradation illustrate how narratives form ‘solutions,’
following Roe (1991). As Adger et al. (2001, p. 683) claim, since discourses are often
based on ‘shared myths’ of the world, ‘the political prescriptions flowing from them
are often inappropriate for local realities.’ Elite narratives about resource management
and control have proved to survive despite evidence of the contrary. Political ecolo-
gists have repeatedly debunked narratives about environmental scarcity and degra-
dation in the Global South (Fairhead and Leach, 1996; Leach and Mearns, 1996),
8 Informant 7, May 6, 2015; informant 45, April 27, 2016.
9 Informant 37, March 8, 2016
10 Informant 2, May 4, 2015; informant 15, November 6, 2015
11 Informant 2, May 4, 2015; informant 45, May 27, 2016.
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but such research is hardly taken into consideration in the formation of environmental
policies (e.g. Svarstad and Benjaminsen, 2017). Roe (1991) pointed to several dis-
courses from rural Africa that have persisted despite ‘strong empirical evidence
against its storyline.’ Gardner (2017), moreover, demonstrated that global elite pol-
icies influence conservation schemes based on discursive policies rather than local rea-
lities. Instead, the resource degradation narrative has proved to be stronger, and has –
by far – justified control over nature through centuries. This provides an explanation
for why there still is a belief in the necessity of ‘us’ intervening to ‘save’ nature from
‘them’ (Eddens, 2017; Gardner, 2017).
4.2. The solution: modernizing natural resource management
Elites have historically sought to control nature, but the reasoning has changed over
the centuries. While colonialism and the development era of the 1950s and 1960s at
least in part was justified by a constructed ‘need’ to save nature, this was reformulated
during the ‘limits’ discourse of the 1970s, and again under the ‘sustainable develop-
ment’ discourse of the 1980s and 1990s. Today, policymakers and powerful actors
have constructed new ‘solutions’ to environmental degradation based on a strong
belief in modernization through technology and capital in natural resource sectors
in the Global South.12 This is linked to a perceived realization of the green economy’s
‘triple bottom line’ of people, planet and profit – a threefold goal that targets the crises
of poverty, the climate and the economy in the same package (Bergius and Buseth,
2019).
One way in which this shift becomes obvious, is how the story about growth has
changed. Peculiarly, the ‘limits to growth’ idea – or story – has turned into ‘green
growth’ under the green economy. Indeed, one of the headings in the UNEP (2011,
p. 14) report reads From crisis to opportunity. This illustrates how rhetoric and
policy has changed from limiting the use of nature to a focus on economic opportu-
nities in nature (World Bank, 2013). This shift offers a useful bridge between the
‘problem’ narrative outlined above, and the ‘solution’ narrative, which holds that
there is an abundance of natural resources and available land in African countries.
In this way, narratives about scarcity and abundance are intertwined and set to rep-
resent two sides of the same story. This win-win narrative holds that the world’s
natural resources are pristine and under threat, but at the same time valuable, with tre-
mendous potential for capital accumulation. This well illustrates the aims of the green
economy, and how the narratives and discursive drivers have shifted. This was also
12 Another highly relevant field in this context, is the resource curse literature. The natural
resource scarcity/ abundance dualism in the resource curse theory is obviously useful also
for the modernization discourse discussed in this paper, but going into these arguments
would be beyond the aims and scope of the paper. However, see e.g. Rosser (2006) for a
review.
12 J. T. Buseth
found by Scoones et al. (2018), who argue that an abundance narrative exists alongside
the scarcity narrative, holding that investment areas are ‘abundant, empty, idle and
underutilized.’ This feeds into policy agendas, investment strategies, green economy
strategies and mainstream green growth rhetoric (e.g. World Bank, 2019; SAGCOT,
2013). Policymakers, practitioners and governments adhere to the story that degraded
or underutilized resources will prosper and be of high economic value only if we allow
technology and market forces to ‘develop’ them (World Bank, 2013, 2019).
Key green economy policy documents usually focus on the latter (i.e. the potential
for capital accumulation). For example, one-third of UNEP’s report Towards a Green
Economy (UNEP, 2011) is devoted to natural capital and how we should invest in it in
order to establish a green economy. This includes both protection of natural resources
to hinder planetary degradation, and modernization of the utilization and management
of natural resources for the purpose of development and (green) economic growth
(OECD, 2009; UNEP, 2011; World Bank, 2019).
One striking example in my data comes from the Global Green Growth Summit in
2016, where a senior associate from the International Institute for Environment and
Development (IIED) started his panel talk by announcing to the 1200 people in the
audience, ‘If you’re from an African government, please sell your land to investors!
In that way we can create green jobs for the poor!’13 This view illustrates the focus
on capital investments and modernization of natural resource management in the
green economy of the Global South, and the belief that external intervention is necess-
ary. Such policy (‘creating green jobs on land sold to foreigners’) is a result of the
belief in the degradation narrative, as well as the focus on poverty (‘we can give
them jobs’). The quote came from a leading green economy policymaker, and his audi-
ence consisted of other leading policymakers at global, regional and national level –
including typically various UN organizations, OECD andWorld Bank representatives,
as well as government and other representatives from the Global South and Global
North, representing respectively the receiving end on the one side, and donors/ inves-
tors on the other side. The quote obviously does not only illustrate this person’s view,
but it represents a strong, leading narrative that is being passed on and circulated
within a broader community of policymakers, decisionmakers, and elites, which
essentially has consequences for how the leading discourse institutionalizes through
policy.
Brockington and Ponte (2015, p. 2197) argue that initiatives such as carbon pay-
ments, ecotourism, and biodiversity offsets largely illustrate the green economy in
the Global South. Such schemes are frequently used by its proponents as examples
of how nature can be protected while at the same time accumulate economic
growth. This illustrates how actors and discourses have changed the rhetoric from a
focus on global crises and planetary degradation to a story about investment opportu-
nities, as well as how new management schemes should be implemented in order to
13 Informant 48, September 6, 2016
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‘restore’ natural capital (OECD, 2009).14 For example, the OECD (2011) argues that
natural resources should be conserved and ‘used more efficiently’ in order to achieve
green growth. Similarly, the World Bank recently published a report on why improved
management, modernization and protection of Tanzania’s natural resources are crucial
in achieving ‘green development’ and sustainability (World Bank, 2019). In an earlier
World Bank report, 10 out of 16 principles for how to establish green growth in the
Global South, deal directly with modernized environmental management (World
Bank, 2012, p. 17). They emphasize carbon pricing, stricter water regulation, better
forest management, coastal zone and fisheries management, land use planning, and
more ‘targeted’ agricultural practices. For example;
[d]ifferent resources require different types of policies. For extractable but renewable
resources, policy should center on defining property rights and helping firms move up
the value chain. For cultivated renewable resources, policy should focus on innovation,
efficiency gains, sustainable intensification, and “integrated landscape” approaches.
(World Bank, 2012, p. 105)
When introducing the World Bank’s Climate Change Investment Plan for Africa15
during the Global Green Growth Summit in 2016, a senior World Bank representative
working on climate change policies, said that,
in the agricultural system, there’s lots of changes to think about, and thinking about
changes in livestock feeding, that can on the one hand increase productivity, on the
other hand increase resilience to climate change, and on the third hand reduce emissions.
It is possible to have these win-win-win solutions. These are the three underlying prin-
ciples for our climate change actions.
Moreover, the same representative said ‘we’re working on the sustainable land
management program, working nationally to transform landscapes at scale in order
to build this resilience.’16 It is interesting enough how he emphasized that they were
working on landscape transformations in a foreign country, which clearly illustrates
the belief in the necessity of external interventions in natural resource sectors in
the Global South. But essentially, this urge to ‘transform’ landscapes rests heavily
on the degradation narrative. The idea that natural resource sectors must be
managed in new ways – i.e. modernized – continues to inform and shape policy.
14 Informant 59, September 8, 2016; informant 53, September 7, 2016; informant 48, August 6,
2016.
15 The policy strategy was called a ‘Climate Change Investment Plan’. I was unable to find a
document with this title, but the World Bank does have an Africa Climate Business Plan,
which might have been what the representative referred to. For the 2016 version, see
http://www.worldbank.org/en/region/afr/publication/africa-climate-business-plan-key-
messages and for an updated version see http://www.worldbank.org/en/programs/africa-
climate-business-plan (both accessed May 30, 2019).
16 Informant 53, September 7, 2016
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This exemplifies how ‘green growth’ agendas have been influenced by persisting nar-
ratives, and is evident in both policy documents and among informants interviewed.
Modernization is seen as both necessary and obvious in sectors that are perceived
as traditional, outdated and underdeveloped, such as pastoralism and agriculture and
other land use systems.17 These narratives are therefore particularly evident in the agri-
culture sector and the new green revolution for Africa (Patel, 2013), which increas-
ingly has been merged with the green economy (Buseth, 2017; Moseley, 2017;
World Economic Forum, 2010). The Malthusian dilemma of how to feed the
world’s growing population is a powerful narrative (World Economic Forum,
2010). Under the green economy, efforts in developing the agriculture sector have
been combined with environmental concerns and climate measures. This conceptual
fusion proposes a greener repetition of the original green revolution (Conway,
1997) to feed a growing world population sustainably. A general argument is that
developing countries should ‘upgrade’ to the level of developed countries’ production
systems by a ‘flow of knowledge, experience and equipment from one area to another,’
usually from developed countries to developing countries (UNEP, 2011, p. 234).
UNEP (2011, p. 36) too, holds that one of the most pressing problems in the contem-
porary world is ‘feeding an expanding and more demanding’ world population, and
‘attending to the needs’ of those that are undernourished, while at the same time
addressing climate change. Hence, ‘environmental degradation and poverty can be
simultaneously addressed by applying green agricultural practices’ (UNEP, 2011,
p. 36), a trend that is increasing under brands such as ‘climate-smart agriculture’
(FAO, 2010) and ‘agriculture green growth’ (SAGCOT, 2013). The World Bank,
for example, presents agribusiness in Africa with the narrative that while Africa has
‘an abundance’ of both land and water, it lacks the capital, knowledge and technology
to ‘unleash’ its opportunities (2013, p. 17). The World Bank also holds that Africa has
become the ‘final frontier’ for agribusiness (World Bank, 2013, p. 17), which exem-
plifies the understanding of the green economy as a ‘spatial fix’ in contemporary capi-
talist reorganization (Harvey, 2001; Patel and Moore, 2017). Other proponents hold
that ‘there is substantial untapped potential for the development of the continent’s
water and land resources for increasing agricultural production’ (NEPAD, 2003,
p. 24), and ‘[t]he continent is endowed with many natural resources, including plenti-
ful land and fertile soils’ (UNECA, 2013, p. 8). In an interview, an informant who was
a foreign land investor in an African country asked,
Have you ever flown across this country? All you can see is vast land areas which are just
laying there. As far as your eye can see. There is plenty! Of no use! And, you know… the
massive population growth… the number of people in this country is going to reach…
yeah. It’s a foreseen catastrophe.18
17 Informant 53, September 7, 2016
18 Informant 7, August 6, 2015.
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Another self-proclaimed green growth investor repeatedly said how the local commu-
nity was ‘scratching dirt,’ living from day to day, degrading the soil, the water and the
forests in ignorance.19 According to this informant, the best solution to the problem
was to establish large-scale commercial farming that had the knowledge and the tech-
nology to manage the land ‘correctly.’ The collaborating authorities on the specific
project this investor was working on, adhered to this story too – at both regional,
national and global levels (World Economic Forum, 2010; World Bank, 2012;
2013; 2019; SAGCOT, 2013). The narratives of overpopulation, resource degradation
and a predicted Malhusian crisis were the most mentioned reasons why investments in
natural resource sectors in developing countries are necessary.20
Clearly, there is a framing of villains in this picture: poor people degrade the soil
with their outdated production systems, lack of knowledge and ignorance. These
people are also often regarded as ‘victims’ in the same story alongside nature as a
victim. The ‘heroes’ in the narrative are policymakers, practitioners, environmental-
ists, and investors who bring green growth, capital inflows, technology transfers,
and essentially modernization to solve the degradation crises. Scholars have contrib-
uted to this view for decades. For example, Hollander (2003, p. 2) writes,
The real enemy of the environment is poverty – the tragedy of the billions of the world’s
inhabitants who face hunger, disease, and ignorance each day of their lives. Poverty is the
environmental villain; poor people are its victims. Impoverished people often do plunder
their resources, pollute their environment, and overcrowd their habitats. They do these
things not out of willful neglect but only out of the need to survive.
Not only foreign investors hold this view, but also elites and national stakeholders
promote similar views when arguing why a green transition is necessary. Such scar-
city narratives feed into policy formation (Hajer, 1995). This is evident through for
example various large-scale land investment schemes that have been rolled out since
the triple F crisis (Buseth, 2017; Scoones et al., 2018; World Economic Forum,
2010), aiming to improve production, alleviate poverty, accumulate economic
growth, and at the same time curb climate change.21 Policy strategies in such initiat-
ives are to a large extent based on narratives of scarcity and degradation, presenting
problems presumed to be solved by technology and capital inflows to natural
resource sectors that are not utilized to their full potentials.
19 Informant 76, November 4, 2016
20 Informant 11, August 12, 2015; informant 4, May 7th, 2015, informant 14, November 6th,
2015
21 Examples include the Southern Agricultural Growth Corridor of Tanzania (SAGCOT), the
Beira Agricultural Growth Corridor (BAGC) in Mozambique, the Ghana Commercial Agri-
culture Project (GCAP), the Green Belt Initiative (BGI) in Malawi, the Bagré Growth Pole
in Burkina Faso, and the Nacala Growth Pole in Mozambique, also called the ProSAVANA
project.
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Finally, deeply integrated in these narratives and the modernization discourse,
there is a strong belief that in order to save the world’s natural resources, we must attri-
bute monetary values to them (OECD, 2009; UNEP, 2011). UNEP (2011, p. 18) holds
that ‘environmental valuation and accounting for natural capital depreciation must be
fully integrated into economic development policy and strategy.’ Furthermore, UNEP
(2011, p. 19) argues that we need to better control the environment in order to make
money from it:
The role of policy in controlling excessive environmental degradation requires imple-
menting effective and appropriate information, incentives, institutions, investments
and infrastructure. Better information on the state of the environment, ecosystems and
biodiversity is essential for both private and public decision making that determines
the allocation of natural capital for economic development.
This quote illustrates the two-sided belief in the need to intervene in ecosystems in
order to ensure capital accumulation, and to protect nature. It links to the broader
debate on neoliberal natures, discussed by e.g. Bigger and Dempsey (2018), and
demonstrates the contemporary turn towards a modernization discourse in natural
resource management in the Global South.
Commodification of natural resources and ecosystem services (Brockington, 2011;
Sullivan, 2013) has directed many actors’ interests towards what are perceived as
‘underdeveloped’ markets in the Global South (World Bank, 2013). Büscher and
Fletcher (2015, p. 273) argue that the new mode of accumulation is best described
as ‘accumulation by conservation,’ defined as ‘a mode of accumulation that takes
the negative environmental contradictions of contemporary capitalism as its departure
for a newfound ‘sustainable’model of accumulation for the future.’Whereas the green
growth discourse rests on a narrative about a need to ‘price nature,’ it merely implies
‘pricing nature to save the economy,’ and not necessarily ‘pricing nature to save
nature’ (Dempsey and Suarez, 2016). When implemented in the Global South, this
narrative is informed by the aforementioned degradation narrative, and is accordingly
transformed into a ‘saving nature’ storyline that masks how these ‘natures’ initially
were framed as investment opportunities (Bailey and Caprotti, 2014; Death, 2015).
This is obvious in particularly OECD’s reports (e.g. 2009). This justifies interventions
in nature, and largely explains how the green economy is regarded as an opportunity to
find new ways to profit from natural resources (Brown et al., 2014). Under the green
economy, actors focus more on utilizing natural resources than on regulating pro-
duction or consumption systems, which are much more damaging to the planet –
but that would disturb global capitalism (Kenis and Lievens, 2016; Patel and
Moore, 2017). Biopower and capital accumulation must not be underestimated as
driving forces in this discourse, or to put it another way, as driving forces in redirecting
the attention away from the fossil industry. Thus, in line with Harvey (2001), the fron-
tiers of this discourse appear as ‘spatial fixes’ to capitalism’s internal contradictions
(Harvey, 2014; O’Connor, 1991). This means not only expanding into new
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‘spaces,’ but also finding new solutions (‘fixes’), which are often short-term and not
sustainable. From this perspective, the green economy emerges as a new ‘frontier’
in contemporary capitalist reorganization.
5. Conclusions
Bailey and Caprotti (2014, p. 1799) argue that green economies in the Global South
represents is a ‘mosaic of practices that displays both synergistic components and
dysfunctional overlaps and which has hazy systems of accountability for ensuring
consistency between higher level visions of the green economy visions and on-
the-ground green-economy strategies.’ We see through piles of existing research
that development interventions and green economy initiatives often are peripheral
to on-ground realities. This is the result of how policy agendas are driven by pre-
vailing and persistent narratives and discourses, and the gap can be explained by
the ways in which policies are informed and shaped by narratives and discursive
powers. Hajer’s (1995, p. 61) concept of discourse institutionalization is useful to
illustrate how actors interpret, shape and transform the green economy agenda.
Actors consciously or unconsciously draw on a variety of selected arguments and
narratives to establish new agendas and policies in responses to new situations,
such as the green economy (Buseth, 2017). In this paper, I have discussed how long-
standing narratives have revitalized to inform, justify and drive contemporary green
economy agendas in resource-rich countries in the Global South. Particularly two
narratives feed into the formation of green economy agendas in the Global South:
first, a neo-Malthusian ‘problem narrative’ of resource degradation, scarcity, and
overpopulation in poor countries, and second, a ‘solution narrative’ saying that
we can overcome the crises by modernizing natural resource management and util-
ization. In this regard, the ‘degradation’ narrative is coupled with an ‘abundance’
narrative, holding that while the planet’s natures are pristine and under threat,
they are also abundant and underutilized, and should be invested in – or ‘developed’
– in order to accumulate green growth, as well as for the purpose of environmental
preservation. In sum, this represents a modernization of natural resource manage-
ment discourse in the green economy in the Global South.
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